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I. THE PUBLIC HAS NO ADVOCATE
AA significant amount of critical information can be hidden withinunfiled discovery. Unfiled discovery can be broadly defined asany document or information exchanged between parties that
takes place outside the presence of the courtroom.1 Protective orders and
confidentiality agreements conceal unfiled discovery that may contain in-
formation paramount to public health or safety, which undermines the
important public policy of court transparency.2 On one hand, there is a
need to protect trade secrets and other confidential business information
exchanged through discovery.3 Of course, a business involved in litigation
runs the risk that its confidential business information will be disclosed to
the general public, possibly causing the loss of trade secret protection.4
Sensitive company (non-trade secret) information also deserves judicial
protection from disclosure to a direct competitor.5 On the other hand,
1. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(2)(b).
2. See Dustin B. Benham, Dirty Secrets: The First Amendment in Protective-Order
Litigation, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1781, 1785 (2014).
3. See Jennifer S. Sickler & Micheal F. Heim, The Impact of Rule 76a: Trade Secrets
Crash and Burn in Texas, 1 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 95, 97 (1993); see also Lehnhard v.
Moore, 401 S.W.2d 232, 236 (Tex. 1966) (noting the importance of protecting trade secrets
through protective orders).
4. See Sickler & Heim, supra note 3, at 97.
5. See Fox v. Anonymous, 869 S.W.2d 499, 504 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1993, writ
denied) (recognizing right of privacy in various business records as an interest subject to
protection under 76a), rev’d on other grounds, 970 S.W.2d 520, 526–27 (Tex. 1998).
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there may be data and information contained in the same discovery that
could have a negative effect on the public’s interest in health and safety—
documents and information that should not otherwise be protected.6
In a civil lawsuit, an attorney’s ultimate goal is to maximize the benefits
to the client, not to the public.7 This means that the attorney has the
incentive to pursue the broadest possible protective order to minimize
the risk of disclosure of any “confidential information.” This prevents im-
portant information, specifically data that may help protect the health
and safety of the public, from entering the public view. Thus, in most
private litigation, the public has no advocate.8
Under Texas law, a court record carries the presumption of openness to
public view.9 This is a positive step in terms of our pursuit of transparent
courts; however, this view does not go far enough. Documentation and
data recovered through discovery can easily be legally crafted to avoid
constituting a court record.10 The development of new information tech-
nology, specifically electronic discovery, dramatically increased the quan-
tity of discovery documents parties in a typical lawsuit currently
exchange.11 For large corporations and businesses, overly broad protec-
tive orders are considered necessary to protect their confidential informa-
tion due to the impracticability of reviewing the massive amount of
information contained in discovery.12 In certain circumstances, however,
broad protective orders and silent settlement agreements keep “confiden-
tial” information out of public view, despite the fact that this information
may have a substantial effect on the public’s interest in health or safety.13
The risk of disclosing harmful information to the public is the economic
incentive to keep it a secret.14
In 1990, the Texas legislature drafted Rule 76a of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure in an attempt to solve the transparency issue and help
alleviate these concerns.15 Rule 76a sets out the requirements for sealing
a court record.16 The rule establishes the presumption that most court
6. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(2)(c); Lloyd Doggett & Michael J. Mucchetti, Public Ac-
cess to Public Courts: Discouraging Secrecy in the Public Interest, 69 TEX. L. REV. 643,
647–55 (1991).
7. See generally 48 TEX. PRAC., TEX. LAWYER & JUD. ETHICS § 6:6 (2015 ed.) (West).
8. See Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 6, at 647–53.
9. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.010 (West 2015); TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(1).
10. See Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 6, at 662. A protective order can be an effi-
cient concealment mechanism. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.6(b). Rule 192.6 directs that the court
may enter an order “[t]o protect the movant from undue burden, unnecessary expense,
harassment, annoyance, or invasion of personal, constitutional, or property rights.” TEX. R.
CIV. P. 192.6(b).
11. See Richard L. Marcus, The Impact of Computers on the Legal Profession: Evolu-
tion or Revolution?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1827, 1846–47 (2008).
12. See id.
13. See Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 6, at 647–53.
14. See Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential
Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REV 867, 880 (2007).
15. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.010 (West 2015).
16. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a.
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records should remain open to public view with limited exceptions.17 This
rule allows courts to grant sealing orders only after confirming that the
private interest at stake outweighs the extensive public interest in access
to information, which is a very high burden for the party seeking to pre-
serve confidentiality.18 This is an important step that many trial judges
may fail to follow. A protective order should not be signed without con-
ducting this analysis. Since court records carry the presumption of open-
ness, once a document has been deemed a court record, it should be an
uphill battle to convince the court to grant a sealing order.19 This burden
should be present even if the protective order is “agreed” or stipulated.
Generally, trial judges are called upon to resolve a conflict. Absent a con-
flict, many “agreed” protective orders can be signed without adequate
review.20 This should not happen. Even if the protective order is “agreed”
to by all parties, trial judges must be aware that the protected documents
may conflict with the goals of Rule 76a.
The most revolutionary part of Rule 76a—and perhaps the most con-
troversial—is that unfiled discovery can sometimes constitute a court re-
cord, which would then be subject to a court’s sealing analysis.21 In other
words, there are many instances in which unfiled discovery should be pre-
sumed to be open and accessible. Unfiled discovery is classified as a court
record (and therefore presumed to be open) if it concerns “matters that
have a probable adverse effect upon the general public health or
safety.”22 To visualize the competing interests surrounding court trans-
parency, consider the oil and gas industry’s practice of hydraulic fractur-
ing (fracking).23 Regulators and scientists have voiced a growing concern
that settlement secrecy in fracking lawsuits inhibits their ability to effec-
tively research the environmental effects on public health and safety.24
On one hand, members of the fracking industry contend that the chemi-
cal formulas composing fracking fluids constitute valuable trade secrets
that should remain protected from competitors in the industry.25 On the
other hand, such fracking fluids can contain cancer-causing chemicals
such as benzene and chromium, heavy metals, and many other petro-
17. Id. § 76a(1).
18. See id.; Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 6, at 677–78.
19. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(1); Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 6, at 677–78.
20. See Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 6, at 646, n.13 (noting that the trial judge
who signs an agreed order may not have enough time or familiarity with the case to ade-
quately weigh the competing interests of the need for privacy versus the public’s health and
safety).
21. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(2)(c); Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 6, at 653–62.
22. TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(2)(c).
23. Natural Gas Flowback: How the Texas Natural Gas Boom Affects Health and
Safety, EARTHWORKS 3 (April 2011), https://www.earthworksaction.org/files/publications/
FLOWBACK-TXOGAP-HealthReport-lowres.pdf [https://perma.cc/9P4L-F8GY].
24. See Ian Urbina, A Tainted Water Well, and Concern There May Be More, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/04/us/04natgas.html?_r=0 [https://
perma.cc/4DHD-F8FX].
25. EARTHWORKS, supra note 23, at 8.
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leum-derived compounds.26 This is information that should not be hidden
from the public. Information that reveals a potential harm to the general
public health or safety is not deserving of trade secret protection.27
Let us assume that a fracking operation leases land adjacent to a local
family farm.28 After some time, all of the family members become ill and
show signs of similar symptoms.29 The family believes that its water sup-
ply has been contaminated by the fracking operation and files a lawsuit
alleging harms caused by fracking.30 Throughout the litigation, broad pro-
tective orders will restrict all discovery information exchanged between
parties, although a majority of the documentation probably lacks any
trade secret or valuable proprietary information.31 The information, al-
though not worthy of judicial protection, is nonetheless kept secret by the
protective order, without consideration of the harmful effects on public
health and safety.32 Private settlements then keep these contamination
claims out of the courtroom, and secrecy provisions of the agreement
keep the plaintiffs silent.33 Therefore, potentially harmful information
will forever remain a secret, and the parties to the suit are the only ones
who have access.34 With the parties now silent, the information ex-
changed during discovery remains forever unknown to the public.35
This hypothetical is actually based in part on the recent landmark case
Parr v. Aruba Petrolium, Inc., in which a jury returned a verdict in favor
of a Texas family alleging harms caused by a fracking operation adjacent
to their property.36 The issue that ultimately reached the jury, however,
26. See id. at 4. Through the 2005 Energy Policy Act, Congress exempted fracking
fluids from the Safe Drinking Water Act. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2005).
27. See Steven C. Laird, Rule 76a: The Public’s Crowbar, TEX. LAW., Dec. 21, 1992, at
12.
28. See generally Parr v. Aruba Petroleum, Inc., No. CC-11-01650-E (Co. Ct. at Law
No. 5, Dallas County, Tex. Apr. 22, 2014).
29. See generally id.
30. See generally id.
31. See Laird, supra note 27.
32. See id.
33. See Jim Efstathiou, Jr. & Mark Drajem, Drillers Silence Fracking Claims with
Sealed Settlements, BLOOMBERG (Jun. 5, 2013 11:00 p.m.), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2013-06-06/drillers-silence-fracking-claims-with-sealed-settlements [https://
perma.cc/37HT-VZFM] (explaining that settling fracking contamination claims and impos-
ing confidentiality “make[ ] it difficult to challenge the industry’s claim that fracking has
never tainted anyone’s water”); see Urbina, supra note 24.
34. See Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 6, at 648–50.
35. See Efstathiou, Jr. & Drajem, supra note 33.
36. Parr v. Aruba Petroleum, Inc., No. CC-11-01650-E (Co. Ct. at Law No. 5, Dallas
County, Tex. Apr. 22, 2014); see David Blackmon, Parr v. Aruba—The Fracking Case That
Wasn’t, FORBES (June 3, 2014, 6:57 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidblackmon/2014/
06/03/parr-v-aruba-the-fracking-case-that-wasnt/#14101a2a1cff [https://perma.cc/W9T8-
S652]. Although hailed as a “landmark” case by anti-fracking activists, due to the lack of
scientific proof for the fracking claims, the issue that ultimately reached the jury was an
intentional nuisance claim. Id.; Mica Rosenberg, Texas Judge Upholds $3 Million Fracking
Verdict, REUTERS (July 15, 2014, 5:44 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fracking-
idUSKBN0FK2JE20140715 [https://perma.cc/MZ5F-4NWK]. Interestingly, the family’s
neighbors had already settled with the same gas company but were prohibited from dis-
cussing their allegations. David Hasemeyer, Damage Award in Texas Fracking Case Raises
Stakes in Air Quality Debate, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (May 28, 2016), http://insidecli-
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was an intentional nuisance claim, not the claims involving fracking.37
This is due to the difficulty in obtaining and producing enough scientific
information or data to link the fracking to their specific harms.38 The
family later learned that their neighbors had already settled with the
same fracking company over similar allegations derived from the same
timeline of events.39 Unfortunately, the family was barred by a confiden-
tiality agreement from discussing their case.40 This restriction on disclo-
sure has also been an issue in many other cases involving dangerous
automotive defects, scandalous judicial activities, and statewide events
such as the West fertilizer explosion.41 The authors of this Article whole-
heartedly prioritize the importance of protecting trade secrets, confiden-
tial information, and privileged documents; however, the authors also
want the trial courts to engage in a balanced approach in applying Rule
76a.
It is time for the court to revisit Rule 76a and provide litigants with
better clarity. In April 2015, the Dallas Morning News noted that “[s]ince
2004, the Supreme Court has agreed to consider at least three cases in
which companies were unhappy with how judges were following the
court’s earlier decision on sharing [information] between attorneys. Each
time, the companies and those who sued them resolved their disagree-
ments before the high court could make a decision.”42
Part II of this Comment further details the relationship between court
transparency and the competing interests involved in discovery.43 Part III
examines the historical background and relevant case law that spurred
the development of Rule 76a.44 Part IV dissects the Texas Supreme
Court’s analysis in General Tire v. Kepple, the precedential case control-
ling Rule 76a’s applicability to unfiled discovery.45 Part IV also evaluates
General Tire’s effect on recent case law.46 Finally, Part V offers recom-
mendations to current judges and practicing attorneys for how to apply
Rule 76a and how to balance the competing interests of court trans-
matenews.org/news/20140528/damage-award-texas-fracking-case-raises-stakes-air-quality-
debate [https://perma.cc/3MPV-YJBB].
37. See Parr, No. CC-11-01650-E.
38. See Blackmon, supra note 36.
39. See Hasemeyer, supra note 36.
40. See id.
41. See Cortez v. Johnston, 378 S.W.3d 468, 475 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, pet.
denied); General Tire, Inc. v. Kepple, 970 S.W.2d 520, 524 (Tex. 1998); Dustin B. Benham,
Benham: Texas Court Should Reject Lawsuit Secrecy, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN
(July 30, 2014, 6:00 PM), http://www.mystatesman.com/news/news/opinion/benham-texas-
court-should-reject-lawsuit-secrecy/ngq6z/#c204f3c2.3829553.735444 [https://perma.cc/
XV46-VCW8].
42. Sue Ambrose, Could Texas’ High Court Curb Trade-Secret Sharing in Safety Law-
suits?, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (last updated Apr. 21, 2015, 3:47 PM), http://
www.dallasnews.com/news/metro/20150418-experts-expect-attempt-to-curb-trade-secret-
sharing-in-suits.ece [https://perma.cc/LUK4-RJMF].
43. See infra Part II.
44. See infra Part III.
45. See infra Part IV.
46. See infra Part IV.
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parency and the protection of confidential client information.47
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COURT TRANSPARENCY,
COURT RECORDS, AND UNFILED DISCOVERY
Discovery serves many purposes. Among the litigants, it serves as an
efficient procedural tool for the exchange of information necessary to de-
velop a case and to provide full disclosure in order to eliminate surprise.48
Many question whether those purposes are also meant to coexist with the
public’s interest in maintaining a transparent and open court system.49
The Supreme Court of Texas stated that “the ultimate purpose of discov-
ery is to seek the truth, so that disputes may be decided by what the facts
reveal, not by what facts are concealed.”50 Unfiled discovery, however,
often helps parties avoid that ultimate purpose.
A. THE OPEN COURTS DOCTRINE
The Texas Constitution states that “[a]ll courts shall be open, and every
person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation,
shall have remedy by due course of law.”51 The “Open Courts Provision”
of the Texas Constitution “ensures that Texas citizens bringing common-
law causes of action will not unreasonably be denied access to the
courts.”52 In Garcia v. Peeples, the Supreme Court of Texas found that
Article I, § 8 of the Texas Constitution mandates that “Texas courts
should be guided by a principle encouraging the free exchange of infor-
mation and ideas.”53 Court transparency and the open courts doctrine are
pillars of the judicial system that have been contemplated throughout
Texas’s legal history.54
Major policy considerations support the open courts doctrine.55 Our
democratic society favors court transparency to encourage public confi-
dence in our judicial system and avoid the perception that our courts are
“star chambers.”56 The public has a strong interest in an open court sys-
47. See infra Part V.
48. See Lopez v. La Madeleine of Texas, Inc., 200 S.W.3d 854, 860 (Tex. App.—Dallas,
2006, no pet.).
49. See Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 6, at 647–55.
50. Jampole v. Touchy, 673 S.W.2d 569, 573 (Tex. 1984).
51. TEX. CONST. ART. I, § 13.
52. Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 664 (Tex. 1983) (stating that the open courts doc-
trine is “quite plainly, a due process guarantee”).
53. Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 349 (Tex. 1987); see TEX. CONST. ART. I, § 8
(“Every person shall be at liberty to speak, write or publish his opinions on any subject,
being responsible for the abuse of that privilege; and no law shall ever be passed curtailing
the liberty of speech or of the press.”).
54. See generally Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 664; McCrary v. City of Odessa 482 S.W.2d 151,
153 (Tex. 1972); Dillingham v. Putnam, 14 S.W. 303, 304–05 (Tex. 1890).
55. See generally Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 664; McCrary, 482 S.W.2d at 153; Dillingham, 14
S.W. at 304–05.
56. See Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1129 (5th Cir. 1991). The
term “star chambers” is the theoretical description of court orders and rulings that cannot
be questioned and lack accountability. Id. See also Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 6, at
652 (upholding that “greater access strengthens democracy”).
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tem that applies the rule of law equally and fairly.57 For example, the
Texas Public Information Act (the Act) provides that any information
collected, assembled, or maintained by or for a governmental entity in
connection with the transaction of its official business is open to the pub-
lic, with certain limited exceptions.58 Judicial records, however, are not
subject to the Act, but are instead subject to the rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court of Texas.59 Thus, the public’s right of access to court
records is not guaranteed.60 This lack of guarantee provides room for
protective orders and confidentiality agreements to contract around open
access, limit the public availability of unfiled discovery, and prevent the
public from accessing information that may impact their health and
safety. This is precisely why the presumption of openness established by
Rule 76a was a significant step in the right direction.
B. COMPETING PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INTERESTS
Should the public have access to documents filed with the court or dis-
covery exchanged between private parties? Proponents of public access
to court records argue that since courts are publicly-funded resources, the
public is entitled to the information contained in discovery documents.61
Opponents of public access argue that the only purpose for discovery is
the efficient exchange of litigant information, and that the public should
have no interest in unfiled discovery.62
Once discovery documentation is properly filed with the county clerk’s
office, that documentation becomes a court record.63 Actual discovery
documentation is rarely filed independently with the court.64 Typically,
attorneys attach discovery to motions filed with the court, which then be-
come part of the court record.65 Section 191.006 of the Local Govern-
ment Code states: “All records belonging to the office of the county clerk
to which access is not otherwise restricted by law or by court order shall be
open to the public at all reasonable times. A member of the public may
make a copy of any of the records.”66 The danger confronting court trans-
57. See Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 6, at 651–52.
58. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.001 (West 2015).
59. Id. § 552.0035(a).
60. See generally id.
61.  See Richard Zitrin, The Judicial Function: Justice Between the Parties, or a
Broader Public Interest?, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1565, 1579 (2004) (“A court, after all, is a
publicly-funded institution; its main function should be to serve the broader interests of the
public.”).
62. See Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the
Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 432 (1991) (detailing the viewpoint that there is no need
for legislation to make sealing court records more difficult to do); see also Richard L. Mar-
cus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 458–59, 468
(1991).
63. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 191.006 (West 2015); TEX. R. CIV. P.
76a(2)(a).
64. See Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 6, at 659.
65. See generally TEX. R. CIV. P. 75a. Such motions are typically a motion to compel,
motion for sanctions, and motion for summary judgment. See id.
66. TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. §191.006 (emphasis added).
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parency is not discovery that is filed with the court.67 Rather, the danger
is unfiled discovery (information only exchanged between the parties and
not filed with the court) dressed in a cloak of confidentiality, protected
from the view of the courtroom and the public.68 Given the advances in
technology and the ease of accessing documents, requests for documents
have become broader and the quantity of unfiled discovery has become
much larger, thus heightening this threat to court transparency.
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Issues involving the sealing of court documents and the subsequent ef-
fect on court transparency first gained considerable public cognizance in
1987, when the Dallas Morning News published a series of articles on the
increasing trend of routine sealing of court files by judges in Dallas
County.69 A six-month investigation revealed that 282 cases in Dallas
County have been sealed since 1920.70 Over 200 of those cases were
sealed after 1980 and another thirty-five cases were sealed in 1986.71
Judges “routinely sealed the cases at the mutual requests of the parties
without extensively questioning the need to seal them,” tending to show a
preference for the individual litigant over the public.72
While most of the records remained hidden from the public, and likely
still do, the Dallas Morning News discovered that “[m]any of the sealed
files came from cases that appeared to have significant interest to the
public,” including dangerous defective products, industry-caused environ-
mental harm, doctors’ sexual misconduct with patients, and “‘sensitive’
issues involving politically connected parties.”73 The Dallas Morning
News articles set the stage for public questioning of the sealing policy.74
Similar reports of sealed cases shortly followed in other parts of Texas,
eventually prompting legislative action.75
Note that this investigation mainly focused on the sealing of documents
that were filed with the court. If courts were allowing documents that
were filed with a public court to be sealed, it was inevitable that courts
were going to hold unfiled discovery as protected and confidential as well.
67. See Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 6, at 647–55.
68. See id.
69. See Steve McGonigle, Secret Lawsuits Shelter Wealthy, Influential, DALLAS MORN-
ING NEWS, Nov. 22, 1987, at 1A, 1987 WLNR 1954693. The district clerk who supervised
the sealed records stated: “From my understanding, a lot of those records were sealed for
other than judicial reasons, probably political considerations, maybe favoritism with cer-
tain law firms.” Id.; see also Steve McGonigle, Sealed Lawsuits Deal with Poisonings, Sex,
Surgery, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 23, 1987, at 1A, 1987 WLNR 1955656 (noting that
none of the cases involved family law or child related litigation).
70. See McGonigle, Secret Lawsuits Shelter, supra note 69.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See Andrew D. Goldstein, Sealing and Revealing: Rethinking the Rules Governing
Public Access to Information Generated Through Litigation, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 375,
394–95 (2006) (citing McGonigle, Sealed Lawsuits Deal, supra note 69).
74. See generally McGonigle, Sealed Lawsuits Deal, supra note 69.
75. See Goldstein, supra note 73, at 395.
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This is particularly troublesome because business documents collected
during discovery are precisely the types of documents that the public
should be aware of in many instances.
A. RULE 76A’S ENACTMENT—COURT RECORDS DEFINED
In 1989, as a response to the widespread improper sealing practices
among Texas courts, the Texas Legislature passed a law requiring the Su-
preme Court of Texas to adopt rules “establishing guidelines for the
courts of this state to use in determining whether in the interest of justice,
the records in a civil case, including settlements, should be sealed.”76 Af-
ter the court submitted the issue to its Advisory Committee, public hear-
ings sparked substantial debate over whether the new rule should apply
to unfiled discovery.77
At the conclusion of the public hearings, the Advisory Committee of-
fered a recommendation to the Supreme Court of Texas.78 In 1990, the
court adopted Rule 76a by a 5–4 vote, with the goal of creating greater
access to civil judicial records to promote public health and safety.79 In an
attempt to balance the competing interests, the court “appl[ied] Rule
76a’s procedural protections only to those forms of unfiled discovery that
are of special interest to the public.”80
Rule 76a adopts the presumption that all court records are open to the
public and allows trial courts to seal court records only upon a showing of
the following:
(a) a specific, serious and substantial interest which clearly outweighs:
(1) this presumption of openness;
(2) any probable adverse effect that sealing will have upon the
general public health or safety;
(b) no less restrictive means than sealing records will adequately and
effectively protect the specific interest assert.81
Under the terms of Rule 76a, subject to certain limited exceptions,
court records include “all documents of any nature filed in connection
with any matter before any civil court,” even if the documents contain
confidential information, including exhibits admitted into evidence or
even proffered at trial.82 The rule requires the party seeking to seal a
76. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.010 (West 2015).
77. See Goldstein, supra note 73, at 395.
78. See Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 6, at 646–47. The recommendation was then
“revised substantially by the supreme court.” Id. at 647.
79. See id. at 647.
80. See Goldstein, supra note 73, at 418; TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(2)(b)–(c).
81. TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(1); see also Upjohn Co. v. Freeman, 906 S.W.2d 92, 96, 101–02
(Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, writ denied) (applying Rule 76a and affirming the trial court’s
order sealing documents).
82. TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(2); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 75a (“The court reporter . . . shall
file with the clerk of the court all exhibits which were admitted in evidence . . . during the
course of any hearing, proceeding, or trial.”); Dallas Morning News v. Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, 842 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Tex. 1992) (“[E]xhibits introduced into evidence are . . .
court records.”).
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court record to (1) file a written motion with the trial court that is accessi-
ble on the court’s public docket and (2) post detailed notice of the motion
with both the trial court and the Supreme Court.83 An “agreed” protec-
tive order is no longer sufficient to seal documents, and the courts should
not allow the implementation of a protective or confidentiality order
without following the Rule 76a procedure—even if the order is agreed to.
The goal of these two requirements was to create awareness of the pro-
posed sealing and possibly create a database concerning the extent of
sealing requests statewide.84
Additionally, the court must hold a hearing for oral arguments, which
is open to the public.85 The party seeking the sealing order must post
public notice of the hearing at least fourteen days in advance.86 Such no-
tice must state the time and place of the hearing and must contain a “spe-
cific description of both the nature of the case and the records . . . sought
to be sealed.”87 Rule 76a gives courts continuing jurisdiction over sealing
orders and allows intervenors to challenge sealing requests of records or
to unseal court records for public view.88 This provision is designed to
allow the public to have an advocate. At the conclusion of a sealing hear-
ing, the court must grant or deny the motion in a written opinion, which
becomes immediately appealable under Rule 76a(8).89
When considering a sealing request, courts must not focus exclusively
on the private interests advanced by the parties.90 Courts must weigh
such private interests against the broader public interest.91 Former Justice
Lloyd Doggett of the Supreme Court of Texas, who drafted Rule 76a,
wrote that the rule is “intended to address those instances where the pub-
lic need is greatest.”92 Justice Doggett went on to state that “the argu-
ment against access to pretrial discovery ignores the larger role that
courts, no less than the other branches of government, play in contribut-
ing to an informed populace.”93
B. 76A’S EFFECTS ON UNFILED DISCOVERY
As mentioned above, Rule 76a’s most controversial aspect involves its
applicability to unfiled discovery.94 Subject to certain limited exceptions,
court records generally include documents that are actually filed in the
record of a civil case.95 Although the term generally does not include
83. TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(3).
84. See Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 6, at 679.
85. TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(4).
86. Id.
87. TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(3).
88. TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(7).
89. TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(8).
90. See Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 6, at 657–58.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 654.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 653–55.
95. See supra note 82.
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unfiled discovery, Rule 76a extends to “discovery, not filed of record,
concerning matters that have a probable adverse effect upon the general
public health or safety, or the administration of public office, or the oper-
ation of government.”96 As a result, the first concern of a party seeking to
preserve the confidentiality of such information would be to “minimize
the number of discovery documents . . . that [may] fall within the defini-
tion of court records.”97 In practice, the easiest way to limit the dissemi-
nation of discovery materials is to negotiate a protective order with the
opposing party.98 A party can draft a protective order with the necessary
language to circumvent the requirements of Rule 76a and keep certain
unfiled discovery private.99 For example, a confidentiality provision could
prevent the dissemination of any documents concerning matters that have
a probable adverse effect on the general public health or safety, thereby
avoiding the identification of any exchanged documents as “court
records.”100
Rule 76a’s application to documents filed with the court varies from its
application to unfiled discovery documents.101 When handling documents
filed with the court, Rule 76a becomes relevant when a party seeks to seal
a document filed with the court.102 Documents filed with the court are
automatically classified as “court records” under Rule 76a.103 They are,
therefore, automatically presumed to be open, and are sealed only after
the court engages in the sealing procedure set forth in Rule 76a(1).104
When handling unfiled discovery documents, Rule 76a becomes rele-
vant when a party wants unfiled discovery documents to be available to
the public (as opposed to documents filed with the court where parties are
seeking to seal).105 First, the court decides if the unfiled discovery is a
court record by determining whether it has a probable adverse effect on
the general public health and safety.106 If it does have that effect, it is
then considered a court record and presumed to be open.107 It can then
only be sealed once the court follows the procedure set forth in Rule
76a(1).108 If the unfiled discovery does not have an adverse effect, it can
be subject to a protective order or confidentiality order with no prob-
lem.109 In several cases following the rule’s enactment, Texas courts ap-
plied Rule 76a inconsistently, further confusing the rule’s applicability.110
96. TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(2)(c).
97. See Sickler & Heim, supra note 3, at 101.
98. See id.
99. See Goldstein, supra note 73, at 375, 377–78; Sickler & Heim, supra note 3, at 102.
100. See Goldstein, supra note 73, at 377–78.
101. See id. at 417–18.
102. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a.
103. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(2).
104. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 76(a)(1).
105. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(2)(c); Goldstein, supra note 73, at 417–18.
106. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(2)(c); Goldstein, supra note 73, at 418.
107. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(1); Goldstein, supra note 73, at 418.
108. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(1).
109. See Goldstein, supra note 73, at 421.
110. See infra Part III.C.
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A case that spurred the movement for the Supreme Court of Texas to
visit Rule 76a’s applicability to unfiled discovery was a 1992 General Mo-
tors (GM) settlement in Fort Worth.111 GM settled a lawsuit with the
family of Frank Zelenuk, a GM employee, who died when his GM pickup
collided with another vehicle and caught fire.112 The claim alleged that
“the placement of the fuel tanks outside the frame railings of the truck
made the tanks more vulnerable to explosion in a collision.”113 Pursuant
to the settlement agreement (that presumably included a confidentiality
provision), the Zelenuk family returned all documents that had been ex-
changed during discovery to GM.114
Soon after the settlement, Public Citizen, a national consumer rights
advocacy group, “intervened pursuant to Rule 76a and asked the court to
disclose the discovery documents to the public.”115 The court held that
Public Citizen first had to prove that the materials produced during dis-
covery constituted “court records.”116 The materials produced included
approximately 80,000 documents detailing crash test results and other
data concerning the fuel system.117 Although Public Citizen still had not
seen the materials, it introduced a deposition of a former GM engineer
from a separate case in which the engineer said that GM had withheld
negative crash test results from him and forced him to testify for GM
favorably, but incorrectly, at trial.118 He stated: “‘If I’d had the benefit of
the testing General Motors hid from me . . . I think my opinion would
have changed right then and there.’”119 Based on this testimony, the
court ruled in Public Citizen’s favor, deeming the documents to be court
records because they had a probable adverse effect upon the general pub-
lic health and safety, and scheduled a Rule 76a sealing hearing.120 On the
morning of the hearing, GM voluntarily removed the protective order
and released the documents to the public.121 The documents revealed
that GM knew, at least since 1974, that its fuel tank design created a
greater fire-hazard risk than other fuel tank designs, but chose not to
change the design until 1988.122 One of the documents was a “perform-
ance review [that] stated concerns about ‘rapidly growing products liabil-
ity litigation involving [the] fuel system’ and ‘escalating jury awards.’”123
111. See Laird, supra note 27, at 12.
112. See id. At the time, GM was a defendant in more than 100 lawsuits relating to the
fuel tank design. Id. The settlement amount was never disclosed. Id.
113. Goldstein, supra note 73, at 419 (citing Laird, supra note 27, at 12).
114. See id.
115. Id.
116. See Goldstein, supra note 73, at 419.
117. See Laird, supra note 27, at 12–13.
118. See Laird, supra note 27, at 13; Mary Hull, 76a Intervention Allowed in Settled
Case: GM Claims Protective Order Shrouds Pickup Crash Data, TEX. LAW., June 15, 1992,
at 5.
119. Hull, supra note 118, at 5.
120. See Goldstein, supra note 73, at 419.
121. See Laird, supra note 27, at 13.
122. Goldstein, supra note 73, at 420 (citing Laird, supra note 27, at 13).
123. Laird, supra note 27, at 13.
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This case is one of the very few occasions in which a party successfully
used Rule 76a to unveil unfiled discovery materials that expose harms
and wrongdoing associated with GM vehicles.124
Comparatively, in Dunshie v. General Motors, another products liabil-
ity case, the Beaumont Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling
that certain unfiled discovery documents did not constitute court
records.125 The disputed documents related to the manufacturer’s devel-
opment and testing of the restraint system of an automobile.126 The trial
court held that the documents “did not concern matters that [would] have
a probable adverse effect upon the general public health or safety.”127
The court based its decision solely upon the testimony of GM’s expert
witness who testified that “the documents [did] not reveal a threat to
public safety” and therefore, did not involve a probable adverse effect
upon the public.128 The particular documents at issue were not presented
to the appellate court, which gave extreme deference to the trial court’s
finding.129
Another case involving Rule 76a’s applicability to unfiled discovery
was Ford Motor Co. v. Benson, where the plaintiffs alleged tire defects on
the Ford Bronco II.130 The focus of the appellate court’s decision sur-
rounded a procedural issue—whether a party may seek a protective order
under Rule 166b without seeking a court record determination under
Rule 76a.131 Prior to exchanging discovery documents, Ford moved for a
protective order.132 Before granting the protective order, the trial judge,
sua sponte, decided that she first needed to hold a Rule 76a determina-
tion as to whether the documents met the definition of court records, i.e.,
whether the documents concerned matters that might have a probable
adverse effect on the public.133 After in camera review of thousands of
documents, the trial judge found that the documents met the definition of
a court record under Rule 76a and denied Ford’s request for a protective
order.134
The Houston Court of Appeals reversed, however, holding that when a
party moves for a protective order, the trial court’s sole task is to deter-
mine whether “good cause” exists to enter the order.135 The court went
on to conclude that Rule 76a only comes into play after documents have
been exchanged and one of the parties alleges that the documents consti-
124. See Goldstein, supra note 73, at 420.
125. Dunshie v. General Motors, 822 S.W.2d 345, 347–48 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1992,
no writ).
126. Id. at 346.
127. Id. at 347.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 347–48.
130. Ford Motor Co. v. Benson, 846 S.W.2d 487, 488 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
1993, pet. denied). Notably, the tire defects in this case led to a deadly rollover.
131. Id. at 490–91; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.6 (replacing Rule 166b).
132. Benson, 846 S.W.2d at 488.
133. Id. at 491.
134. Id. at 490.
135. Id. at 491.
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tute court records.136 Additionally, the court held that the party opposing
a Rule 166b(5)(c) protective order carries the burden of showing that the
party seeking the protective order must first comply with Rule 76a’s court
record determination.137 Since the judge denied the request for a protec-
tive order, the documents were never exchanged, which left the opposing
party with no basis to assert that the specific documents contained infor-
mation concerning matters that had a probable adverse effect upon the
general public’s health and safety.138 Because there was “no allegation or
proof that any of the documents were ‘court records,’” the trial court had
no basis to determine compliance with 76a.139 The appellate court re-
versed the trial court’s order holding that without a challenge that the
protective order involved court records, Rule 76a does not come into
play.140
Essentially, Benson initially provided parties with an avenue to con-
tract around Rule 76a’s application to unfiled discovery.141 In other
words, a party could seek a protective order before any documents were
exchanged. This would then prevent the applicability of Rule 76a because
the court would not have any documents to review for purposes of deter-
mining whether they were court records. Rule 166b was subsequently re-
pealed. After much procedural inconsistency, the Supreme Court of
Texas attempted to provide clarity to Rule 76a’s applicability with regard
to unfiled discovery in General Tire v. Kepple.142
IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF 76A’S APPLICABILITY TO
UNFILED DISCOVERY
A. GENERAL TIRE V. KEPPLE
Although the Houston Court of Appeals reversed the trial court in
Benson, the initial trial court’s decision that the documents constituted
court records resulted in leaks of various internal documents available to
the public.143 These documents became known as the “Benson docu-
ments” and were utilized by lawyers in other suits against Ford.144 The
Benson documents played a prominent role in another Ford rollover
case—General Tire, Inc. v. Kepple.145 General Tire was the first and last
136. Benson, 846 S.W.2d at 491.
137. Id.
138. Id. The plaintiffs, however, did have an opportunity to view the documents during
the in camera review. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 491–92.
141. See Goldstein, supra note 73, at 421; Sickler & Heim, supra note 3, at 102; see also
Tollack v. Allianz of Am. Corp., No. 05-91-01943-CV, 1993 WL 321458, at *6 (Tex. App.—
Dallas Aug. 16, 1993, writ denied) (finding that stipulated agreements, such as protective
orders and settlements, did not violate Rule 76a).
142. See General Tire, Inc. v. Kepple, 970 S.W.2d 520, 526 (Tex. 1998); General Tire,
Inc. v. Kepple, 917 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996).
143. See General Tire, 917 S.W.2d at 447.
144. See General Tire, 970 S.W.2d at 526; General Tire, 917 S.W.2d at 447.
145. See generally General Tire, 970 S.W.2d at 526.
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time the Supreme Court of Texas reviewed Rule 76a’s applicability with
regard to unfiled discovery.146 Since General Tire, the authors are aware
of no reported cases that have applied Rule 76a’s court record determina-
tion to unfiled discovery, despite the confusion related to the rule and the
ambiguities that need clarification.147
1. Case Summary of General Tire
In General Tire, Inc. v. Kepple, Kyle Kepple brought a product liability
action against General Tire and Ford Motor Company, alleging that a tire
defect—caused by tread separation—led to a rollover accident, para-
lyzing Kepple.148 General Tire obtained a protective order covering seven
general categories of documents, all alleged to contain trade secrets.149
After the case settled, Kepple’s counsel moved to nullify the parties’
protective order pursuant to Rule 76a, asserting that unfiled discovery
documents in the case concerned matters adverse to public health and
safety and therefore constituted court records and should be open to the
public.150 Kepple’s attorneys claimed that the documents contained re-
ports proving that General Tire had an inordinately high defect rate,
which caused tread separation.151 General Tire claimed the documents
contained confidential commercial information and trade secrets.152 Gen-
eral Tire argued that the disclosure of the documents would give competi-
tors an unfair advantage and, therefore, should not be available for public
access.153
The trial court conducted a Rule 76a hearing, at which both parties
presented documents and expert testimony for an in camera court re-
view.154 General Tire produced documents that it originally provided dur-
ing discovery.155 The plaintiffs obtained and produced the Bensen
documents that were originally exchanged in the Bensen case discussed
above.156 Additionally, several parties intervened and were present for
146. See generally id. at 520.
147. See Goldstein, supra note 73, at 423.
148. General Tire, 917 S.W.2d at 446.
149. Id. at 449. The seven categories included in the protective order were: “(1) cured
tire standards; (2) specification revisions; (3) product change proposals; (4) testing; (5)
mold drawings; (6) adjustment data; and (7) miscellaneous documents including customer
inquiries, record retention schedules and Ford tire release.” Id.
150. Id. at 447. Kepple’s attorneys were aware of a similar case involving General Tire
and Ford, in which the companies filed a grievance action against an attorney in Georgia
for failure to comply with a similar protective order. Id. Kepple’s attorneys moved for
relief to avoid similar problems. Id.
151. Id. at 450–51.
152. Id. at 452.
153. General Tire, 917 S.W.2d at 449.
154. Id. at 447.
155. Id.
156. Id. The attorney-plaintiffs represented the plaintiffs in Ford Motor, Co. v. Benson,
and retained information and data relating to General’s tire defects. Id. at 447, 455 n.1. See
Ford Motor Co. v. Benson, 846 S.W.2d 487, 488 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993,
pet. denied).
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the in camera review.157 After the hearing, the trial court determined that
the information contained in the documents would “have a probable ad-
verse effect on the general public health or safety,” and thus, were court
records.158 Accordingly, these documents were presumed to be open and
subject to Rule 76a’s sealing analysis.159 During the sealing hearing, the
trial court found that General Tire failed to demonstrate that the docu-
ments should be closed to the public and vacated the parties’ protective
order, thereby unsealing the discovery materials.160 The appellate court
affirmed the trial court’s decision and held that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in determining that the unfiled discovery constituted
court records and was, therefore, presumed to be open.161
During its review of the trial court’s order, the Houston Court of Ap-
peals set out a two-part test under Rule 76a for sealing confidential
records with regard to unfiled discovery.162 First, the proponent of access
has the burden of proving that the unfiled discovery meets Rule 76a’s
definition of court records.163 Second, if the proponent of access suc-
ceeds, the burden then shifts to the party seeking to preserve confidenti-
ality to rebut the presumption that those court records should be open.164
After the Houston Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order,
General Tire petitioned to the Supreme Court of Texas for a writ of
mandamus.165
2. The Supreme Court of Texas Reviews General Tire
The Supreme Court of Texas overturned the lower courts’ decision that
the discovery materials constituted court records under Rule 76a, thereby
allowing the discovery materials to remain protected and confidential.166
First, the court held that the trial court erred by applying Rule 76a’s no-
tice and hearing provisions to the threshold determination of whether un-
filed discovery constituted court records.167 In addition, the court held
that persons other than the parties may intervene before the court record
determination, but they may not have immediate access to the documents
(i.e., be present during the in camera review).168 The court reasoned that
applying Rule 76a’s notice and hearing provisions to the court record de-
termination would be overly burdensome on the trial court at such a pre-
liminary stage.169 The court also noted that “Rule 76a could easily
157. General Tire, 917 S.W.2d at 447.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 447–48.
160. Id. at 447.
161. Id. at 451–52.
162. General Tire, 917 S.W.2d at 449–52.
163. Id. at 449–451.
164. Id. at 451–52.
165. General Tire, Inc. v. Kepple, 970 S.W.2d 520, 523 (Tex. 1998).
166. Id. at 529.
167. Id. at 524.
168. Id. at 524–25.
169. Id. at 524.
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become a tool for delay and gamesmanship” or “parties might view the
rule as so cumbersome that they would make elaborate arrangements to
avoid its requirements.”170 The court also expressed concern with the
possibility of intervenors gaining access to confidential documents before
the court determines whether they are court records.171
Second, the court held that a trial court could not broadly rely on evi-
dence that the manufacturer’s product contains a defect in determining
whether unfiled discovery constitutes court records.172 In other words,
the trial court could not rely on evidence of a defect to determine
whether the unfiled discovery had had a probable adverse effect on the
general public health or safety. Rather, the party seeking access must
“demonstrate some nexus between the alleged defect and the documents
at issue.”173 With regard to the documents—categorized as “cured tire
standards; specification revisions; product change proposals; developmen-
tal testing documents; tire mold drawings; . . . and miscellaneous [docu-
ments]”—the court held that the plaintiffs’ evidence “did not link the
alleged defect to any of these documents.”174 The plaintiff’s evidence re-
lied on two expert witnesses.175 One expert was a consultant who special-
ized in tire failure analysis and had previously viewed the very documents
as an expert witness in other cases against General Tire.176 He testified
that tread separations in tires of this design were responsible for several
serious traffic accidents.177 He considered the root cause of the problem
to be the defect in the “skim stock.”178 Another expert for the plaintiff
testified that “General changed its skim stock compound in 1987, and
that any documents relating to that change would be important to the
public safety.”179 According to the court, neither expert was “able to cor-
relate any defect in [the] tires with a specific document or set of
documents.”180
The remaining category of documents was the “tire adjustment
data.”181 These documents charted the frequency with which General
Tire’s customers returned certain tires under warranty and the reasons
behind those returns.182 One of General Tire’s experts testified that the
tire adjustment data was primarily used as a “marketing tool” for cus-
tomer feedback.183 The plaintiff’s expert witness, however, characterized
the data as a “report card” for the tire industry and testified that General
170. General Tire, 970 S.W.2d at 524.
171. Id. at 524–25.
172. Id. at 527.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 526–27.
175. Id. at 527.






182. General Tire, 970 S.W.2d at 527.
183. Id.
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Tire’s report card revealed an “extraordinary amount of tread separa-
tions.”184 He also testified that tread separations can make a vehicle lose
control and listed specific instances in which people had been severely
injured in accidents caused by tread separation.185 General Tire’s expert
claimed that computer errors incorrectly combined tread separations with
other reasons for tire adjustments.186 He claimed the adjustment chart
greatly overstated the number of adjustments due to tread separations.187
The corrected figures indicated adjustments of only 0.8% due to tread
separation, compared to the previous 1.5%.188 The court held that the
adjustment data did not constitute a court record since “[n]o one chal-
lenged that the data had been properly corrected, and there [was] no evi-
dence that the corrected adjustment data could adversely affect public
health or safety.”189
Thus, the court held that the plaintiff failed to “demonstrate some
nexus between the alleged defect and the documents at issue,” and thus,
failed to prove that the disputed documents revealed any public haz-
ard.190 The court noted that, although physical inspections revealed pur-
ported defects in defendant’s tires, there was no proof that any of the
disputed documents exposed those defects.191 It concluded that the trial
court abused its discretion in classifying the documents as court
records.192 The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and
remanded the case to the trial court “for the sole purpose of reinstating
the protective order.”193
B. GENERAL TIRE’S ISSUES AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
The court’s analysis and holding in General Tire v. Kepple “essentially
overturned the unfiled discovery provision of Rule 76a.”194 Without the
ability to view the documents, the burden on third party intervenors
(those seeking for the documents to be open and unsealed) to prevail on
a court record determination is completely impractical.195 Most impor-
tantly, the holding confuses the application of Rule 76a, leaving trial
judges with a precedent that is confusing, inconsistent, and lacking in ap-
propriate guidelines for determining whether specific unfiled discovery
constitutes a court record.196 As stated earlier, the authors are aware of
no reported cases since General Tire that have applied Rule 76a to un-
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 528.
187. Id.
188. Id. Plaintiff’s expert believed 1.5% to be the maximum acceptable amount. Id.
189. General Tire, 970 S.W.2d at 528.
190. Id. at 527–28.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 528.
193. Id. at 529.
194. See Goldstein, supra note 73, at 422; see generally General Tire, 970 S.W.2d at 527.
195. See Goldstein, supra note 73, at 423; see generally General Tire, 970 S.W.2d at 527.
196. See generally General Tire, 970 S.W.2d at 524–27.
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filed discovery.197
1. Impractical Intervention
The court’s holding that Rule 76a’s notice and hearing provisions
should apply only after conducting the threshold court record determina-
tion creates great difficulty and inconvenience for third party intervenors
and other proponents of access.198 This holding requires the presiding
court to first determine whether the unfiled discovery constitutes “court
records” before notifying the public and other parties that may have an
interest in the outcome.199
Furthermore, the actual litigants will rarely, on their own, file a motion
for a court record determination, especially if a lucrative settlement
agreement incentivizes the parties to comply with an “agreed upon” con-
fidentiality provision.200 Thus, the practicality of this limitation results in
a single avenue—“to hope that the trial judge is willing” to move sua
sponte for a Rule 76a court record determination and “inspect the docu-
ments in camera and make an independent ruling on the matter.”201
Additionally, the burden on the party seeking dissemination of unfiled
discovery appears unduly burdensome.202 The proponent, advocating for
the openness of the document and that the document constitutes a court
record (by demonstrating that it has a probable adverse effect on the
public health and safety), must “demonstrate some nexus between the
alleged defect and the documents at issue.”203 The court’s holding sup-
ports the position that the party seeking dissemination holds the burden
to demonstrate the exact nature and likelihood of adverse effects that are
evidenced in certain data or a particular document.204
How can a party or a public advocate (intervenor), generally with no
expertise in an industry, know what documents they may need from a
manufacturer to prove their claim?205 In the situation where only the par-
ties to the litigation receive the opportunity to review the discovery
materials, third-party intervenors have little or no knowledge of the docu-
ments needed to make a formal request to the court to review the discov-
ery.206 Contrast this with the plaintiff’s expert in General Tire who had an
opportunity to view the documents and still could not satisfy the “nexus
between the alleged defect and the documents at issue.”207 This burden is
197. See Goldstein, supra note 73, at 423; see generally General Tire, 970 S.W.2d at 524.
198. See Goldstein, supra note 73, at 399–400; see generally General Tire, 970 S.W.2d at
527.
199. See generally General Tire, 970 S.W.2d at 527.
200. See Laird, supra note 27, at 12; but see Ford Motor Co. v. Benson, 846 S.W.2d 487,
491 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. denied) (trial judge motioned sua sponte).
201. See Goldstein, supra note 73, at 423.
202. See General Tire, 970 S.W.2d at 524; id.
203. See General Tire, 970 S.W.2d at 527.
204. See id.
205. See Goldstein, supra note 73, at 423.
206. See id.
207. See General Tire, 970 S.W.2d at 527–28.
2016] A Re-Visit of Rule 76a 329
ill-defined and too harsh for those parties who are likely unfamiliar with
the information contained in the specific documents claimed to be
confidential.208
There must be a balance between protecting the public’s interest and
protecting a client’s confidential information. The authors of this Article
are fully aware of the importance of protecting confidential business doc-
uments. The authors also understand and fully support the importance of
ensuring that unaffiliated intervenors do not gain access to these types of
documents as a product of a Rule 76a challenge. In fact, the authors only
advocate for a system where a client’s confidential documents are fully
protected. We do believe, however, that possible intervenors should re-
ceive notice and should have an opportunity at a hearing to articulate the
documents they believe to be within the unfiled discovery that could ad-
versely affect the public health and safety. These intervenors should not
be able to view the documents. Instead, they should have an opportunity
to make an initial argument, and the trial court should then review the
documents in camera and consider the arguments set forth by the inter-
venors. The authors also believe there needs to be greater clarification as
to the meaning of “nexus” and “probable adverse effect” previously dis-
cussed above.
2. Confusing Judicial Guidelines and Application—Specifically in
Light of Trade Secret Law
There are many unanswered questions that remain in regard to a trial
judge’s discretion in applying Rule 76a.209 For example, the lack of pre-
cise guidelines has led to the possibility that Rule 76a may undermine
important trade secret protection provided by Texas Rule of Evidence
507 (TRE 507).210 Furthermore, the legislature enacted recent statutory
changes regarding trade secrets that have an influence on a trial judge’s
discretion with regard to granting or denying of protective orders.211
In the context of trade secrets, Rule 76a and TRE 507 both address
distinct disclosure issues with regard to discovery.212 Rule 76a addresses
this issue of dissemination of discovery documents from private litigation
to the public.213 TRE 507 addresses disclosure of discovery documents
between the private litigants.214 But if a court applies Rule 76a’s analysis
208. See generally id. at 524.
209. See generally General Tire, 970 S.W.2d at 526; Goldstein, supra note 73, at 399. Are
judges qualified to inspect records in camera? Can judges be held accountable for granting
a sealing motion when there is no record of what documents were sealed or why they were
sealed? Should there be a public representative to inspect the records? Does this nullify
any attempt of even having a public representative to protect the public about unforeseen
harms within unfiled discovery? See Goldstein, supra note 73, at 399.
210. See TEX. R. EVID. 507; see generally In re Continental General Tire, Inc., 979
S.W.2d 609 (Tex. 1998).
211. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 134A.006 (West 2015).
212. See generally TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a; TEX. R. EVID. 507.
213. See generally TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a.
214. See generally TEX. R. EVID. 507.
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to protective orders that were issued during a TRE 507 ruling, are we
thwarting the policy of TRE 507?215 When the party resisting discovery
establishes that the requested information is a trade secret during a TRE
507 hearing, the only reason these documents should be disclosed is be-
cause they are “necessary for a fair adjudication” of the requesting
party’s claim.216 If the court deems trade secret information necessary for
the requesting party to prove its case, the court is required to issue a
protective order.217 Can a party ask the court to invoke Rule 76a’s analy-
sis to undermine a protective order that the court previously thought nec-
essary to protect the trade secret information, because of some public
interest?218 It seems plausible that a Rule 76a motion can undermine a
TRE 507 proceeding by requesting the court to invalidate a protective
order that was necessary for disclosure in the first place to protect third
parties who were not present in the court during the trade secret determi-
nation.219 Although the authors are not aware of a TRE 507 protective
order that has been challenged by a Rule 76a motion, the outcome is
possible and needs to be addressed by the court.220
Additionally, recent statutory changes have also affected a trial judge’s
discretion with regard to trade secrets.221 In 2013, the Texas Legislature
enacted the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act (TUTSA) to codify and
modernize Texas law on misappropriation of trade secrets.222 Under
TUTSA, a trade secret means information that “is the subject of efforts
that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”223
This standard mandates that the court consider the nature of the trade
secret and the facts and circumstances surrounding the efforts to maintain
its secrecy to determine whether these efforts were reasonable under the
circumstances.224 TUTSA “creates a presumption in favor of granting
protective orders to preserve . . . trade secrets,” which can drastically
limit a judge’s discretion.225 This presumption gives courts the power to
seal filings and records without following the burdensome requirements
215. See generally TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a; TEX. R. EVID. 507.
216. See TEX. R. EVID. 507; In re Continental General Tire, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 609, 613
(Tex. 1998).
217. See TEX. R. EVID. 507; In re Continental, 979 S.W.2d at 613.
218. See generally TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a; TEX. R. EVID. 507.
219. See generally TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a; TEX. R. EVID. 507.
220. See generally TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a; TEX. R. EVID. 507.
221. See Joseph F. Cleveland Jr. & J. Heath Coffman, Protecting Trade Secrets Made
Simple: How the Recently Enacted Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act Provides a Legislative
Framework for Litigating Cases, 76 TEX. B. J. 751, 755 (2013).
222. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 134A.001–.008 (West 2015); see id. at 752.
223. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 134A.002(6).
224. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 134A.002(6); Cleveland & Coffman,
supra note 221, at 752. See also Astoria Indus. of Iowa, Inc. v. SNF, Inc., 223 S.W.3d 616,
634 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied) (holding under Texas common law (before
TUTSA), “[b]efore information can be termed a trade secret, there must be a substantial
element of secrecy.”). A substantial element of secrecy exists when, “except by use by
improper means, there would be difficulty in acquiring the information.” Cleveland &
Coffman, supra note 221, at 753.
225. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 134A.007(c); David Drez & Meredith
Perry, 37th Annual Advanced Civil Trial Course - The Model Protective Order 5 (2014),
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of Rule 76a.226 It provides courts the power to limit disclosure of infor-
mation to only attorneys and experts and also order parties not to dis-
close alleged trade secrets.227 Importantly, TUTSA provides that “[t]o
the extent that this chapter conflicts with the Texas Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, this chapter controls.”228 Thus, although the authors are aware of
no reported cases that have addressed the issue, it appears nonetheless
that a § 134A.006 motion would permit courts to also grant “agreed
upon” protective orders without the burdens of complying with 76a.229
Now that trade secrets are afforded greater protection, there is a drastic
need for new guidance relating to the unfiled discovery provisions of
Rule 76a.230
C. RECENT CASES RELATED TO 76A AND UNFILED DISCOVERY
Three cases have involved Rule 76a’s application to unfiled discovery
since General Tire; however, these cases did not provide any additional
clarification as to Rule 76a’s application other than dicta.231 In BP Prod-
ucts North America, Inc. v. The Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. and
Cortez v. Johnston, the unfiled discovery was determined to constitute a
court record for reasons other than the public health and safety require-
ments of Rule 76a.232 In BP Products, the issue was whether the fifteen
witness statements detailing an explosion concerned matters that had a
probable adverse effect upon the public.233 The appellate court, however,
found the question to be moot and did not proceed through Rule 76a’s
analysis.234 Unfiled discovery can also constitute a court record if it con-
cerns matters having a “probable adverse effect upon . . . the administra-
tion of public office.”235 In Cortez v. Johnston, the issue was whether
unfiled discovery pertaining to a judge’s alleged illicit acts concerned
matters having a probable adverse effect upon the administration of pub-
lic office.236 The last case, ICON Benefit Administrators II, L.P. v. Mullin,
is an example of how overly broad protective orders can permit parties to
avoid the burdens of complying with Rule 76a.237
http://www.texasbarcle.com/Materials/Events/13099/164275_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LW
C-4MBN].
226. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 134A.006; Cleveland & Coffman, supra
note 221, at 752.
227. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 134A.006.
228. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 134A.007(c); Drez & Perry, supra note
225, at 5.
229. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 134A.007(c).
230. See id.
231. See generally BP Products N. Am., Inc. v. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co., 263 S.W.3d
31, 33 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist] 2006, no pet.); Cortez v. Johnston, 378 S.W.3d 468,
475 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2012, pet. denied).
232. See generally BP Products, 263 S.W.3d at 33; Cortez, 378 S.W.3d at 475.
233. BP Products, 263 S.W.3d at 33.
234. Id.
235. TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(2)(c); see Cortez, 378 S.W.3d at 475.
236. See Cortez, 378 S.W.3d at 475.
237. See ICON Benefit Administrators II, L.P. v. Mullin, 405 S.W.3d 257, 259 (Tex.
App.—Dallas, 2013, pet. denied).
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1. BP v. The Houston Chronicle
In BP Products, a civil action was filed in the Galveston County Dis-
trict Court for personal injuries and deaths of those affected by a 2005
explosion that occurred at BP’s Texas City facility.238 During discovery,
BP produced many documents, including fifteen witness statements from
BP’s internal investigation.239 The plaintiffs agreed to keep the discovery
confidential pursuant to a protective order.240 The Houston Chronicle
and the Galveston County Daily News intervened on April 15, 2005, and
filed a motion to unseal the discovery.241 BP voluntarily produced the
fifteen witness statements to the plaintiffs and the Houston Chronicle, but
redacted the names and identifying information of the witnesses.242 After
an in camera review of the witness statements, the trial court held that the
fifteen witness statements were court records that concerned matters that
had a probable adverse effect upon the general public’s health or
safety.243
The Houston Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s determination
that the witness statements were court records, but not because the state-
ments fell under Rule 76a’s court record definition.244 Because BP agreed
to release the information, although redacted, it effectually made the wit-
ness statements available to the public as if they were a court record.245
The court of appeals held that the question of whether the witness state-
ments were court records was moot.246
2. Cortez v. Johnston
Unfiled discovery that concerns matters having a probable adverse ef-
fect on the administration of office should limit privacy rights in the case
of a public figure or judge.247 A recent high-profile case surrounds the
former Judge Carlos Cortez’s alleged scandals and his defamation case
against attorney Randy Johnston.248 In Cortez, the Dallas Court of Ap-
peals ruled on whether depositions attached to motions for sanctions sub-
mitted within thirty days of the case being non-suited constituted court
records as defined by Rule 76a.249 The trial court held that the deposi-
tions of Cortez were court records, concerning matters having a “proba-
ble adverse effect upon the administration of public office,” as defined




242. Id. at 34.
243. BP Products, 263 S.W.3d at 33.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 35.
246. Id.
247. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(2)(c); Cortez v. Johnston, 378 S.W.3d 468, 475 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2012, pet. denied).
248. Cortez, 378 S.W.3d at 475.
249. Id. at 473.
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under Rule 76a and were presumably available for public disclosure.250
The court of appeals affirmed.251
Cortez later appealed, requesting the discovery documents to be
sealed.252 The Dallas Court of Appeals stated: “[c]ourt records, as de-
fined by Rule 76a, ‘are presumed to be open to the general public’ [and]
[t]he party seeking to seal court records has a heavy burden.”253 The
court’s opinion involved a policy discussion related to the public’s right to
know about a “publically elected member of the state judiciary . . . with
allegations of criminal activity.”254 While the adverse effects of a judge’s
scandal on the administration of public office is clear in this context, there
is still much confusion regarding matters having a probable adverse effect
upon the public health and safety given the vague language.255
3. ICON Benefit Administrators v. Mullin
Even trial judges should remain aware of the consequences of granting
an overly broad protective order even when it is agreed.256 For example,
in ICON Benefit Administrators II, L.P. v. Mullin, after signing an
“agreed upon” protective order, the trial judge lost discretion in deter-
mining whether future (non-existent at the time) documents fell under
protection.257 In that case, the City of Lubbock contracted with ICON to
provide administrative services for the City’s self-funded health care
plan.258 A few years later, ICON filed suit against certain City employees
alleging the City employees made defamatory statements about ICON’s
administrative services.259 While the suit was pending, the City hired
Sally Reaves to conduct an audit (Reaves Audit) of the services ICON
performed for the City’s health care plans.260 Employees of the City
sought pretrial discovery of certain information from ICON to aid in
Reaves’s audit work.261 ICON responded by moving for a protective or-
der that “defined certain categories of ‘Protected Materials’ and re-
stricted the use and disclosure of ‘Protected Materials’ and ‘all
information derived therefrom.’”262 The trial judge signed the protective
order that had been submitted as an “agreed order.”263 As noted previ-
ously, a judge does not have the obligation to accept or enforce a pro-
250. Id. at 475.
251. Id.
252. Cortez v. Johnston, No. 06-13-00120-CV, 2014 WL 1513306, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Dallas Apr. 16, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.).
253. Id.
254. Id. at *5.
255. See generally TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(2)(c).
256. See generally ICON Benefit Administrators II, L.P. v. Mullin, 405 S.W.3d 257, 259
(Tex. App.—Dallas, 2013, pet. denied).
257. See id.
258. Id. at 260.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. ICON Benefit Administrators, 405 S.W.3d at 260.
262. Id.
263. Id.
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posed protective order even though it is “agreed.” In fact, judges must be
careful not to give protected status to even unfiled discovery when the
documents involve public interest and welfare without engaging in the
Rule 76a analysis.
The parties eventually settled and the trial court dismissed the case
before Reaves completed her audit.264 Soon after, “the City received
open record requests for the Reaves Audit pursuant to the Texas Public
Information Act.”265 Upon notice of these requests, ICON filed a motion
to enforce the protective order to prevent public disclosure of the au-
dit.266 ICON argued that the protective order prohibited disclosure of the
audit because the audit “contain[ed] information from, and [was] derived
from, ‘Protected Materials.’”267 The City employees, joined by the City,
disagreed and submitted a copy of the audit to the trial court for an in
camera review to determine whether it was subject to the terms of the
protective order.268 A hearing was held on the motion, and afterwards,
the trial court denied ICON’s motion to enforce the protective order and
signed an order declaring that the protective order did not prohibit dis-
closure of the audit.269
Under the belief that the judge’s order was directly appealable under
Rule 76a(8), ICON appealed to the Dallas Court of Appeals.270 The
court of appeals found that the trial court’s order did not relate to the
sealing and unsealing of court records.271 It held that the trial court’s in
camera review and ruling on this issue was only “to determine whether
[the audit] was subject to the terms of the protective order.”272 It also
held that the proper procedural mechanism for review of an order is to
seek a writ of mandamus, not an appeal.273
Considering judicial resources, however, the court treated the im-
proper appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus.274 The appellate court
then determined whether the trial court abused its discretion in determin-
ing that the protective order did not prohibit disclosure of the audit.275
The appellate court considered the trial court’s determination “as a legal
conclusion to be reviewed with limited deference to the trial court.”276
Construing the order under contract law, the court looked to the plain
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. ICON Benefit Administrators, 405 S.W.3d at 260.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 260–61.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 261–62.
271. ICON Benefit Administrators, 405 S.W.3d at 262–63.
272. Id. at 262.
273. Id. at 63. A court order denying a motion to enforce a family code protective
order, however, is directly appealable. See Cooke v. Cooke, 65 S.W.3d 785, 788 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.).
274. Icon Benefit Administrators, 405 S.W.3d at 263.
275. Id. at 263–65.
276. Id. at 263.
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language of the protective order.277 The court stated that the protective
order “broadly and unambiguously restrict[ed] the use and disclosure not
only of information or documents referred to as ‘Protected Materials,’
but also ‘all information derived therefrom.’”278 It was undisputed that
Reaves created the audit using protected materials.279 Because the plain
language of the protective order prohibited the public disclosure of the
audit, the court held that the trial court order was a clear abuse of discre-
tion (in its interpretation of the protective order) and directed the trial
court to vacate its order denying ICON’s motion to enforce the protective
order.280 According to the appellate court, the trial court essentially re-
leased its authority to govern the protective order to the parties. It ap-
pears that the appellate court failed to consider the Rule 76a
requirements when it applied simple contractual standards to this unfiled
discovery.
Even if the language of the protective order contained a broad and
unambiguous restriction, the analysis set forth in Rule 76a must still be
applied. This case, however, at the very least sets forth a warning for all
trial judges of the consequences of routinely signing an agreed protective
order without considering in significant detail the requirements set forth
in Rule 76a.
V. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
THE SECRECY CRISIS
The rules regarding protective order standards, trade secret privileges,
and sealing of court records under Rule 76a were all promulgated before
the information age developed into what it is today.281 New information
technologies, specifically electronic discovery, has substantially affected
the discovery process. Compared to hard-copy discovery, e-discovery ac-
commodates a larger quantity of information than was subject to produc-
tion in the past.282 Because of the widespread use of computer-based
communication and information storage, there is a vast amount of infor-
mation available from computerized sources.283 E-mail, for example, has
created important issues with regard to confidentiality.284 This free ex-
change of information has “expanded [the] potential for intrusions on liti-
gants’ private lives” and created a greater risk for publication of sensitive
personal information.285 Additionally, the ease with which these docu-
ments are obtained and distributed has encouraged attorneys to cast a
277. Id. at 264.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 265.
281. See generally Marcus, supra note 11, at 1844.
282. Id. (quoting Jason Krause, What a Concept!, 89-AUG. A.B.A. J. 60 (2003)) (“Some
major cases now involve one terabyte of information, which, if printed to paper, would fill
the Sears Tower four times.”).
283. See Marcus, supra note 11, at 1846.
284. See id.
285. See id. at 1838–39.
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wide net in terms of their requests for documents. Not only is there a
significant burden on both parties because of these requests, broader re-
quests also create the risk that confidential documents will be distributed.
In order to limit the amount of confidential document exposure, attor-
neys should work toward narrowing document requests.
The economic incentives for secrecy are so great that parties become
willing and have been able to circumvent the intention of Rule 76a.286
Specifically, parties can avoid complying with Rule 76a’s requirements
with relative ease.287 It has been over twenty years since the Supreme
Court of Texas opined in General Tire, and as repeated above, the au-
thors are aware of no reported cases that have applied Rule 76a to un-
filed discovery (at least in the context of public health and safety).288
Therefore, the Texas Supreme Court should revisit General Tire and re-
view Rule 76a’s applicability in the modern legal system.289 At the very
least, the court should clarify with more specificity the evidentiary thresh-
old sufficient to satisfy the burden of proving that unfiled discovery con-
stitutes a court record.290 Part of our recommended solution is to
promote greater awareness for trial judges and attorneys about their role
in this process.291 Included are some proposed tools for conducting dis-
covery as well as a proposed ethical duty for attorneys.292
A. REVISIT OF GENERAL TIRE
The Supreme Court of Texas could help by revisiting General Tire v.
Kepple for clarity regarding Rule 76a’s applicability to unfiled discov-
ery.293 As evidenced by the dearth of case law, the current application of
Rule 76a with regard to unfiled discovery is ineffective or, at the very
least, undeveloped.294 The practical effect of proving the “nexus between
the alleged defect and the documents at issue” is nearly impossible.295
There is also a need to provide greater clarification regarding the defini-
tion of “general public health or safety” and what actions or information
can constitute an “adverse effect” with regard to unfiled discovery.296
Additionally, the court should address whether the harm has to be physi-
cal, and if so, whether only the most dangerous effects fall into that
category.297
286. See Richard Zitrin, Why Lawyers Keep Secrets About Public Harm, 12 NO. 4 PROF.
LAW 1, 2 (2001); Moss, supra note 14, at 874.
287. See Zitrin, Why Lawyers Keep Secrets, supra note 286, at 1–2.
288. See Goldstein, supra note 73, at 423; see generally General Tire, Inc. v. Kepple, 970
S.W.2d 520 (Tex. 1998).
289. See infra Part V.A.
290. See generally General Tire, 970 S.W.2d at 524; infra Part V.A.
291. See supra Part IV.B–C.
292. See supra Part IV.B–C.
293. See generally General Tire, 970 S.W.2d at 524.
294. See Zitrin, The Judicial Function, supra note 61, at 1587; see generally General Tire,
970 S.W.2d at 524.
295. See generally General Tire, 970 S.W.2d at 524, 527.
296. See generally id. at 523–24.
297. See generally id.
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1. Specific Proof of Burden to Prove Nexus
The burden for the proponent of access when seeking determination of
a court record is vaguely described by the court as follows:
A party cannot demonstrate that a manufacture’s proprietary design,
research, and testing records have a probable adverse effect on the
public health or safety . . . merely by producing evidence of a defect
in the manufacturer’s products. Rather the party must, at a mini-
mum, demonstrate some nexus between the alleged defect and the
documents at issue.298
Given the lack of case law on this topic, this burden as described by the
court is inadequate. Consequently, it is difficult to predict how the Texas
courts should rule when determining whether this nexus exists. There are
a number of possible unanswered questions as to whether a nexus exists
between a defect and the documents, for example: (1) testing records
clearly stating that a defect in the steering wheel prevented the car from
turning completely, thereby causing a number of accidents; (2) internal
research demonstrating a company’s concerns about a particular antibi-
otic’s side effects; or (3) a series of e-mails from a company’s top officials
admitting to the severity of defects. Would any of the information con-
tained in these documents be sufficient to warrant the disclosure of these
documents? How harmful does the defect need to be? How clear does
the nexus between the information and the potential harm need to be?
These are all questions that are still seemingly unanswered given the lack
of case law. Additionally, the current case law creates a nearly impossible
burden for the party seeking to disclose these important documents. This
is particularly interesting given that Rule 76a set forth a presumption of
openness for court records. When it comes to unfiled discovery, it seems
as if this presumption is reversed.
The court seemed to indicate where it might lean when it analyzed
Texas Rule of Evidence 507, stating that parties should disclose trade
secrets “only where the information is ‘material and necessary to the liti-
gation and unavailable from any other source.’”299 In Continental, the
plaintiffs failed to meet the burden because “[t]he only evidence that
[the] plaintiffs presented was deposition testimony from Continental’s ex-
pert . . . [who testified] that a compound that ‘doesn’t have the right in-
gredients in it’ could cause a belt separation.”300 We could therefore
speculate that this type of evidence would not suffice under Rule 76a
either. The court has essentially set a very high test for the mandatory
disclosure of trade secret information during discovery.301 Can we assume
from the holding that if the court is resistant towards disclosing trade
secret information within private litigation, it will be equally or more re-
298. Id. at 527.
299. In re Continental General Tire, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 609, 615 (Tex. 1998); see also TEX.
R. EVID. 507.
300. In re Continental, 979 S.W.2d at 615.
301. See id.
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sistant towards disseminating that information to the public?302 The vast
majority of information subject to protective orders, however, contains
less sensitive non-trade secret information, and the court might be willing
to protect the public at a higher rate.303
The bottom line is that the court should provide litigants and third
party intervenors with greater guidance as to the nexus that would give
rise to the disclosure of important documents that adversely affect the
public health and safety. If this guidance is not provided, these parties
will not know what is needed to prove up whether the unfiled discovery
should be considered a court record, and the ultimate goal of Rule 76a
will fail.
2. Define “Public Health and Safety”
As explained above, Rule 76a states that unfiled discovery concerning
matters that have a “probable adverse effect upon the general public
health or safety” should be presumed open to the general public.304 This
language, however, is vague and difficult to apply practically. The court
needs to articulate the definition of “general public health and safety”
and what Rule 76a should strive to protect.305 Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “public health” as “the health of the community at large” and
“the healthful or sanitary condition of the general body of people or the
community en masse, especially, the methods of maintaining the health of
the community, as by preventive medicine and organized care for the
sick.”306 An open question to consider is whether the harm has to affect a
certain number of individuals.307 The court has provided a limited exam-
ple in stating that “[a] ‘nuisance in fact’ is a condition that ‘endangers the
public health [and] public safety.’”308 However, this example is not likely
intended to encompass the only instance of endangerment to the
public.309
Our recommendation is that public health and safety should not be
defined so narrowly as to only relate to personal injury claims. The defini-
tion under Rule 76a should also include environmental issues and busi-
ness practices that violate the public’s interest.310 The focus of this
requirement should be geared toward those parties who affirmatively in-
troduce products to the public that contain certain risks that they would
302. See generally id.
303. See Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 6, at 647–55.
304. TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(2)(c).
305. See id.
306. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 737 (10th ed. 2014). See Whitman v. American Truck-
ing Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 465–66 (2001) (holding that the ordinary meaning of the
term “public health” is “health of the community” or “health of the public”).
307. See generally TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(2)(c).
308. City of Dallas v. Stewart, 361 S.W.3d 562, 591 (Tex. 2012) (quoting State v. Spar-
tan’s Indus., Inc., 447 S.W.2d 407, 413 (Tex. 1969)).
309. See id.
310. See Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 6, at 645.
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not be exposed to otherwise.311 This would put promoters of dangerous
products in the crosshairs of Rule 76a, which aligns with the purposes
behind the creation of the rule.312 Examples would include documents
that relate to (1) side effects of drugs and other medications, (2) over-
arching product liability, (3) research addressing illnesses or viruses, (4)
natural disasters, and (5) crime. That list is certainly not exhaustive. Ad-
ditionally, to “adversely affect the public health and safety” does not
mean that the effect must be widespread. There should be no specific
number of affected individuals that necessarily gives rise to the sealing or
openness. Rather, the courts should fully weigh the factors outlined in
Rule 76a. While this is a determination that may require significant advo-
cacy, the trial courts have the ability to efficiently make this determina-
tion through the proceedings outlined in Rule 76a(3).
3. Utilize the Notice and Hearing Provisions of Rule 76a
As discussed above, the court in General Tire held that Rule 76a’s no-
tice and hearing provisions should not be applied to the threshold deter-
mination of whether unfiled discovery constitutes court records.313 The
court stated that applying the notice and hearing provisions to the court
record determination would be overly burdensome at such a preliminary
stage. The court noted that “[i]f this were allowed, a party, merely by
claiming that unfiled discovery met the standard for a court record under
Rule 76a(2)(c), could trigger an elaborate, expensive process in any case
where unfiled discovery has been exchanged.”314 The court noted that
parties may find the rule so overly cumbersome that they may seek ar-
rangements to avoid the requirements. The court also noted concerns
with allowing intervenors to see confidential documents before the courts
had even determined whether they are court records. The authors of this
Article fully acknowledge the court’s concerns; however, we believe that
a notice and hearing can assist the courts in determining whether unfiled
discovery is a court record while still avoiding the concerns outlined by
the court in General Tire.
As noted above, the application of Rule 76a to unfiled discovery is
slightly more challenging than the application of Rule 76a to documents
that are being filed with the court.315 When handling a court record that
is going to be filed with the court, Rule 76a applies when a party wants
that court record to be sealed.316 The presumption is that the court record
will remain open; however, the party can ask the court to follow the Rule
76a procedure and seal the court record if the determination is proper.
Unfiled discovery presents a different challenge. Unfiled discovery is
not presumed open unless it concerns matters that have a probable ad-
311. See id.
312. See id.
313. General Tire, Inc. v. Kepple, 970 S.W.2d 520, 524 (Tex. 1998).
314. Id.
315. See supra Part III.B.
316. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(1).
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verse effect upon the general public health or safety. In other words, the
unfiled discovery will not be presumed open until the party seeking it to
be open has demonstrated that the documents have a probable adverse
effect upon the general public health or safety. Once that is demon-
strated, the unfiled discovery will be classified as court records and the
party then seeking to protect those documents may ask the court to follow
the Rule 76a procedure in making that determination.
Based on this explanation, it seems clear that the courts will, at some
point, need to make an educated decision as to whether the unfiled dis-
covery documents present the adverse effect (and nexus) discussed
above. The court is implying that the notice and hearing processes are not
needed until the second stage (after the unfiled discovery is determined
to be a court record and where the court then has to decide whether that
“court record” should be sealed). We believe that the notice and hearing
process would be equally as valuable if applied to the earlier stage as
well.
It will be difficult for the court to determine whether unfiled discovery
adversely affects the public health and safety without context. Without
any testimony, the court may not understand why a particular document
could arguably have a significant effect on the public health and safety.
For example, before a court signs a protective order, the court needs to
ensure that none of the unfiled discovery documents have a probable ad-
verse effect upon the general public health or safety—because if they do
have that effect, they should be presumed open and the court should fol-
low the procedure set forth in Rule 76a before signing the protective or-
der. Accordingly, we recommend that the court take a second look at
whether the notice and hearing provisions should apply at the court re-
cord determination stage when reviewing unfiled discovery. In fact, in or-
der to avoid the gamesmanship that the court worried about or the
concern of parties seeking alternative arrangements, the courts can first
require briefs (with page limits) outlining why a particular set of docu-
ments does or does not adversely affect public health or safety. Then, if
necessary, the court can hold a very short hearing—but only if the court
needs additional information. The authors simply want the courts to have
the option of holding a hearing so that they can make an informed deci-
sion. Further, to avoid the court’s concern of intervenors viewing confi-
dential documents, the documents should be reviewed in camera. In fact,
the court even acknowledges this by noting that “Rule 76a anticipates this
problem by allowing the trial court to ‘inspect records in camera when
necessary.’”317 Therefore, the courts can still have access to a hearing to
ensure access to all information while still being conscious of the concerns
expressed by the court in General Tire.
317. General Tire, Inc. v. Kepple, 970 S.W.2d 520, 525 (Tex. 1998).
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B. GREATER JUDICIAL AWARENESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Trial judges should be vigilant of the possibility of inadvertently aiding
in a party’s improper concealment.318 New technologies and e-discovery
have not only promoted greater access to information but have also cre-
ated a greater incentive to preserve secrecy.319 Thus, new information
technology has created an incentive for overly broad protective orders in
a number of ways.320 It is often a temptation for trial judges to sign any
agreed order, including protective orders, since the main objective for
each judge is to resolve conflict. Accepting protective orders without con-
sidering Rule 76a, however, is problematic. As explained above, if the
court signed the protective order without considering the types of docu-
ments the order is protecting, there is a chance the court could be pro-
tecting unfiled discovery documents that have a probable adverse effect
on public health and safety. If the court is protecting these types of docu-
ments without presuming they are open and following the steps outlined
in Rule 76a, that is simply counterproductive and misaligned with Rule
76a’s purpose.
While the technologies mentioned above promote greater access to in-
formation, they can also provide judges with efficient tools to use in de-
termining whether certain discovery falls within the scope of a protective
order.321 Judges should also consider implementing a standard protective
order so that many of these problems can be avoided in most cases.
1. Losing Control
As stated above, judges should remain aware of the consequences of
granting an overly broad protective order.322 ICON Benefit Administra-
tors II, L.P. v. Mullin exemplifies the risk of signing an “agreed upon”
protective order that can result in a trial judge losing discretion and au-
thority in determining what documents fall under the protection of a pro-
tective order.323 Most of the time, parties agree to protective orders and
confidentiality agreements but fail to comply with disclosure procedures
under Texas law.324 Some judges may not be inclined to sit through a full
day of reviewing disclosure requests during a motion to compel.325 Judges
should refuse to sign overly broad protective orders and require parties to
craft more narrow protective orders that only protect the sensitive infor-
mation worthy of protection.326 Although a judge may be nominally pre-
sent in a public proceeding, these protective order proceedings have
318. See Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 6, at 650–51.
319. See Marcus, supra note 11, at 1839.
320. See generally id. at 1837–39.
321. See Benham, supra note 2, at 1827–28.
322. See generally ICON Benefit Administrators II, L.P. v. Mullin, 405 S.W.3d 257, 259
(Tex. App.—Dallas, 2013, pet. denied).
323. See generally id. at 264–65.
324. See Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 6, at 650–51.
325. See id. at 679.
326. See generally ICON Benefit Administrators, 405 S.W.3d at 259.
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recently resembled an arbitration proceeding, where much of the pro-
ceeding and aftermath is hidden from public view.327
2. Alternative Tools to Aid in Protection – Specifically a Standardized
Protective Order
Can technology be used as an effective way to determine which docu-
ments are confidential and militate the need for overly broad protective
orders?328 Could the technology also be used to determine whether par-
ticular documents are ones that would probably adversely affect the gen-
eral public health and safety? Some courts and law firms are currently
using “predictive coding” and algorithm-based search technology to aid
with the exchange of discovery.329 Based on limited user input, this tech-
nology can predict, identify and classify categories of documents that are
relevant to the scope of discovery, or within a privileged category.330 The
use of this technology could be effective in determining whether a certain
document falls within the scope of a proposed protective order or
whether the documents fall under a category that would then lead them
to be presumed open.331
This algorithm-based search technology could also be used by the court
system as a tool for public awareness.332 The predictive coding could be
used to search though the petitions filed. Cases that affect the public’s
interest in health and safety could likely involve similar allegations and
similar wording that could be identified by the search engine.333 The crea-
tion of a committee or agency to monitor and review this petition
database could be an efficient enforcement mechanism.334 Even though
this technology could potentially streamline the process, there is no sub-
stitute for the court’s independent judgment, evaluation, and determina-
tion as to whether unfiled discovery could have the adverse effect
discussed above.
More importantly, the creation of a standardized protective order is
another approach to prevent overly broad protective orders.335 A stan-
dardized protective order can require the party seeking to expand the
protection of the protective order to show that dissemination would harm
the proprietary value of the confidential information.336 Going further,
327. See Laird, supra note 27, at 12.
328. See Benham, supra note 2, at 1827–28.
329. See Charles Yablon & Nick Landsman-Roos, Predictive Coding: Emerging Ques-
tions and Concerns, 64 S.C. L. REV. 633, 637–38 (2013).
330. See id. at 659; Benham, supra note 2, at 1827–28.
331. See Benham, supra note 2, at 1827.
332. See Yablon & Landsman-Roos, supra note 329, at 634.
333. See id.
334. See Mark Lisheron, Judicial Panel May Keep Records Secret, Texas AG Says,
TEXAS WATCHDOG (Dec. 11, 2012, 3:28 PM), http://www.texaswatchdog.org/taxonomy/
term/1103 [https://perma.cc/XK6N-L6MN].
335. See Timothy Lendino, C. King, Evan Sauda, Confidentiality and Protective Orders,
DRI’S FOR THE DEFENSE (July 2013), http://www.smithmoorelaw.com/Confidentiality-and-
Protective-Orders-08-05-2013 [https://perma.cc/EMS5-QXDK].
336. See id.
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the protective order could include a provision giving the judge authority
to sign a protective order only after acknowledging that none of the dis-
covery materials, with limited exceptions, concern matters that have a
probable adverse effect upon the general public.337 Judge Craig Smith,
one of the authors of this Article, has a standard protective order availa-
ble on the Dallas County website that he encourages litigants in his court-
room to use.338 This standardized protective order is only four pages (a
stark contrast to the twenty-plus page proposed protective orders that
Judge Smith’s court often receives). Additionally, this standard protective
order has a specific provision addressing public health and safety: “Noth-
ing in this Order is intended to prevent any party from raising with the
court any concern that the non-disclosure of certain Confidential Mate-
rial may have a possible adverse effect upon the general public health or
safety, or the administration or operation of government or public
office.”339
The standardized protective order also states that “[t]his Order does
not seal Court Records in this case and is only intended to facilitate the
prompt production of discovery materials.”340 The order explains that
any motion to seal must adhere to Rule 76a and also states that any de-
termination regarding protection will be ruled upon pursuant to any ap-
plicable notice and hearing provisions.341 Finally, the order explains:
“This Order merely provides a framework for the parties to claim such
materials as confidential to preserve their right to seek protection for
these documents as confidential proprietary information, and to preserve
such issues for ruling until each party may prepare their appropriate argu-
ments on these issues.”342 This language allows courts to avoid the prob-
lem stated earlier: blindly protecting documents before determining
whether they should in fact be protected.
There is always a chance that if protective orders are made more oner-
ous and harder to obtain, parties will likely go “underground” and cir-
cumvent the courtroom.343 There are certainly problems that arise from
that type of side dealing, as discussed below.
C. THE ATTORNEY PROBLEM
Lawyers on both sides of the docket lead the “secrecy parade.”344 They
sign agreements, actively participating in the cover-up of information—
information which, if disclosed, could potentially save lives.345 They often
337. See id.
338. See Standard Protective Order for the 192nd Judicial District (Dallas County,
Texas) http://www.dallascounty.org/department/courts/civildistrictcourts/192nd/documents/
ProtectiveOrder_Exhibit_030216.pdf [https://perma.cc/3H9T-88FT].
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pursue arbitration and avoid the courts altogether. We strongly advocate
for the addition of a new Model Rule of Professionalism and Ethics that
provides attorneys with an incentive to protect the public due to the fear
of reprimand (and thus avoid Rule 11 agreements on the side).346 Addi-
tionally, attorneys should be encouraged to collaborate their discovery
efforts into resource databases to promote efficient quality
representation.347
1. Abuse of Rule 11 Agreements
As an alternative to seeking a protective order from the court, attor-
neys can enter into an agreement under Rule 11 of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure.348 Rule 11 provides that an agreement between lawyers
in a case is enforceable as long as the agreement is “in writing, signed,
and filed with the papers as part of the record.”349 In practice, an attor-
ney seeking to preserve confidentiality for his or her client may only be
willing to exchange discovery if opposing counsel enters into a Rule 11
agreement, promising to remain silent.350 A judge does not have to sign a
Rule 11 agreement in order for it to be enforceable.351 Additionally, the
agreement between parties is not a motion, pleading, or plea.352 If an
attorney does choose to file the Rule 11 agreement, the filing does not
constitute a “request for enforcement or any other affirmative action by
the trial court.”353 Thus, the trial judge will likely remain unaware of the
agreement’s existence.354 The agreement becomes a contract upon execu-
tion, rather than when the trial court attempts to enforce it.355 Trial courts
have a ministerial duty to enforce valid Rule 11 agreements.356
In many instances, some attorneys believe that the benefits of settling
with a confidentiality agreement outweigh the costs of dissemination of
certain information.357 Consider the situation where after the exchange of
discovery, an attorney for the plaintiff uncovers sensitive company infor-
mation that depicts a causal link between an alleged defect and the result-
ing harm (to the individual plaintiff and/or public health and safety).358
The party seeking to preserve confidentiality will probably present the
opposing party with a settlement agreement, which will likely contain a
confidentiality provision.359
346. See supra Part V.C.2.
347. See supra Part V.B.2.
348. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 11; In re The Dallas Morning News, Inc., 10 S.W.3d 298 (Tex.
1999).
349. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 11.
350. See In re The Dallas Morning News, 10 S.W.3d at 298.
351. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 11.
352. See Exito Elecs. Co. v. Trejo, 142 S.W.3d 302, 305 (Tex. 2004).
353. See id. at 306.
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355. See Coale v. Scott, 331 S.W.3d 829, 831–32 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.).
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If a party is unwilling to remain silent, however, that party could re-
voke its consent to Rule 11 agreements at any time until judgment is ren-
dered.360 However, if a party revokes its consent to a Rule 11 agreement,
the agreement can be enforced through a separate action for breach of
contract.361 Essentially, Rule 11 agreements have been used as a way to
contract around judicial review.362 Where there is no protection from
state laws, attorneys who believe entering into a secrecy agreement is in
their client’s best economic interests “will simply do so.”363 Even under
the belief that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct permit disclo-
sure, an attorney’s perceived duty of advocacy will outweigh any possibil-
ity of dissemination.364
While a Rule 11 agreement will seem like an “easy way out” of the
Rule 76a presumption of openness, attorneys should keep in mind that
that the Rule 11 agreements do not have the weight of a court order.
Rather, the parties will have to pursue a completely separate breach of
contract cause of action to enforce the Rule 11 agreement if there is a
potential breach.
Parties will also avoid Rule 76a and the courts altogether by bringing
their claims to arbitration, an alternative to litigation. As the American
Arbitration Association explains, “[a]rbitration is the submission of a dis-
pute to one or more impartial persons for a final and binding decision,
known as an ‘award.’”365 Procedurally, arbitration can be much more
flexible than litigation. If the courts fine tune and articulate the Rule 76a
procedures as discussed in this article, parties may not avoid the courts
through arbitration as often as they do now.
2. Ethical Duty to the Public
Current and future practicing attorneys should advise their clients
about the potential harm to the public in requesting secret settlements,
protective orders, and the sealing of court files.366 Similar to the ethical
rules that limit client confidentiality, ethics rule-makers should imple-
ment and enforce a rule that “ensures that lawyers [cannot] contract away
their ability to disclose known, discovered dangers to the public” for the
benefit of their client.367 In 2001, Richard Zitrin, one of the nation’s lead-
ing authorities on legal ethics and attorney conduct, presented Proposed
Rule 3.2(B) to the Ethics Commission.368 Proposed Rule 3.2(B) states:
360. See id.
361. See Woody v. Woody, 429 S.W.3d 792, 796 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014,
no pet.).
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346 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making an agreement
among parties to a dispute, whether in connection with a lawsuit or
otherwise, to prevent or restrict the availability to the public of infor-
mation that [the lawyer reasonably believes] [a reasonable lawyer
would believe] directly concerns a substantial danger to the public
health or safety, or to the health or safety of any particular
individual(s).369
The commission rejected the idea and concluded that such a rule had
specific policy implications and should be dealt with by legislation or
court rules.370 The new rule would be similar to the current Model Rule
of Professional Conduct 1.6(b), which allows attorneys discretion to dis-
close attorney-client privileged information in limited discretionary cir-
cumstances.371 An attorney or judge could submit a complaint to an
advisory committee, similar to the State Commission on Judicial Conduct
and other local Judicial Ethics Committees throughout the state.372 This
attorney would essentially serve as a whistleblower. The attorney and
committee would then be under a duty to keep the complaint confidential
until it has been properly reviewed.373
A major concern is that these discretionary rules regarding professional
conduct carry the potential risk of violating a professional duty to the
client and the potential for a malpractice claim.374 In the situation where
a lawyer does have a duty to disclose information that concerns substan-
tial harm to the public health and safety, this new duty could include a
stringent burden on the client alleging breach of attorney client privilege,
since they are likely the ones wanting to avoid disclosure.375 The authors
of this Article do not advocate for this proposed ethics rule to supersede
any rule related to the attorney client privilege or work product privilege.
Additionally, the authors emphasize and support the protection of confi-
dential documents. The authors advocate, however, for the responsibility
of attorneys to disclose documents adversely affecting public health and
safety that would otherwise be available in discovery, but for the protec-
tive order. The authors advocate for the implementation of Mr. Zitrin’s
proposed rule outlined above, which would give attorneys more guidance
and create better balance.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite a specific rule in Texas aimed at establishing a presumption of
open courts, there is often a difficulty within the judicial system in balanc-
369. See id. at 8.
370. See id. at 5.
371. See id.; see generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 1994).
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373. See generally id.
374. See id. at 6.
375. See generally id.
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ing transparency and confidential private interests.376 First, this difficulty
can arise when a judge signs an agreed protective order or confidentiality
agreements without adequate assessment of Rule 76a’s considerations.377
Second, this difficulty arises in the professional capacity of an attorney—
where attorneys advocate for broad, all-encompassing protective orders
or share confidential documents through informal exchanges outside the
courtroom.378 Each of the proposed solutions presented in Part IV carries
its own benefits and consequences.379
As noted throughout this Article, the authors of this Article fully em-
brace and support the importance of protecting confidential documents.
The authors do, however, want to ensure that the courts remain open
when matters involve an adverse effect on the public’s health and safety.
We want to work towards ensuring that our society does not endure mul-
tiple scenarios where (1) a plaintiff brings a lawsuit, (2) the plaintiff de-
termines a severe defect in a particular product or process, and then (3)
that defect is hidden or masked until the next plaintiff fights its way
through the system in order to disclose the same defect. This jeopardizes
the health and productivity of our society, this wastes valuable judicial
resources, and this often lets companies or entities off the hook when
they should instead be held accountable.
In the end, the debate as to whether unfiled discovery should be dis-
closed to the public will continue until the Supreme Court of Texas or
legislature takes action. This Article has outlined several key areas where
the courts, the legislature, and litigants can focus to ensure better clarity
and understanding of Rule 76a so that all parties’ interests are protected
and a well-developed procedure is followed.
376. See supra Part V.
377. See supra Part V.B.
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348 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
